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ABSTRACT
In fighting against fake news, many fact-checking systems com-
prised of human-based fact-checking sites (e.g., snopes.com and
politifact.com) and automatic detection systems have been devel-
oped in recent years. However, online users still keep sharing fake
news even when it has been debunked. It means that early fake
news detection may be insufficient and we need another comple-
mentary approach to mitigate the spread of misinformation. In this
paper, we introduce a novel application of text generation for com-
bating fake news. In particular, we (1) leverage online users named
fact-checkers, who cite fact-checking sites as credible evidences
to fact-check information in public discourse; (2) analyze linguis-
tic characteristics of fact-checking tweets; and (3) propose and
build a deep learning framework to generate responses with fact-
checking intention to increase the fact-checkers’ engagement in
fact-checking activities. Our analysis reveals that the fact-checkers
tend to refute misinformation and use formal language (e.g. few
swear words and Internet slangs). Our framework successfully gen-
erates relevant responses, and outperforms competing models by
achieving up to 30% improvements. Our qualitative study also con-
firms that the superiority of our generated responses compared
with responses generated from the existing models.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Our media landscape has been flooded by a large volume of falsified
information, overstated statements, false claims, fauxtography and
fake videos1 perhaps due to the popularity, impact and rapid infor-
mation dissemination of online social networks. The unprecedented
amount of disinformation posed severe threats to our society, de-
graded trustworthiness of cyberspace, and influenced the physical
world. For example, $139 billion was wiped out when the Associated
1https://cnnmon.ie/2AWCCix
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Study what General Pershing of the United States did to 
terrorists when caught. There was no more Radical 
Islamic Terror for 35 years!
@user Stop spreading fake news. This Pershing story has 
long been debunked! https://t.co/7Vyi5AoeG1
Original tweet
Fact-checking tweet
Original 
Poster
Fact 
checker
Figure 1: A real-life fact-checking activity where the fact-
checker refutes misinformation in the original tweet.
Press (AP)’s hacked twitter account posted fake news regarding
White House explosion with Barack Obama’s injury.
To fight against fake news, many fact-checking systems ranging
from human-based systems (e.g. Snopes.com), classical machine
learning frameworks [20, 34, 38] to deep learning models [29, 39,
56, 57] were developed to determine credibility of online news and
information. However, falsified news is still disseminated like wild
fire [31, 59] despite dramatic rise of fact-checking sites worldwide
[21]. Furthermore, recent work showed that individuals tend to
selectively consume news that have ideologies similar to what
they believe while disregarding contradicting arguments [8, 35].
These reasons and problems indicate that using only fact-checking
systems to debunk fake news is insufficient, and complementary
approaches are necessary to combat fake news.
Therefore, in this paper, we focus on online users named fact-
checkers, who directly engage with other users in public dialogues
and convey verified information to them. Figure 1 shows a real-life
conversation between a user, named original poster, and a fact-
checker. In Figure 1, the original poster posts a false claim related
to General Pershing. The fact-checker refutes the misinformation
by replying to the original poster and provides a fact-checking
article as a supporting evidence. We call such a reply a fact-checking
tweet (FC-tweet). Recent work [52] showed that fact-checkers often
quickly fact-checked original tweets within a day after being posted
and their FC-tweets could reach hundreds of millions of followers.
Additionally, [9] showed that the likelihood to delete shares of fake
news increased by four times when there existed a fact-checking
URL in users’ comments. In our analysis, we also observe that after
receiving FC-tweets, 7% original tweets were not accessible because
of account suspension, tweet deletion, and a private mode.
Due to the fact-checkers’ activeness and high impact on dissem-
ination of fact-checked content, in this paper, our goal is to further
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support them in fact-checking activities toward complementing
existing fact-checking systems and combating fake news. In par-
ticular, we aim to build a text generation framework to generate
responses2 with fact-checking intention when original tweets are
given. The fact-checking intention means either confirming or re-
futing content of an original tweet by providing credible evidences.
We assume that fact-checkers choose the fact-checking URLs by
themselves based on their interests (e.g., https://t.co/7Vyi5AoeG1 in
Figure 1). Therefore, we focus on generating responses without au-
tomatically choosing specific fact-checking URLs, which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
To achieve the goal, we have to solve the following research prob-
lems: (P1) how can we obtain a dataset consisting of original tweets
and associated fact-checking replies (i.e., replies which exhibit fact-
checking intention)?; (P2) how can we analyze how fact-checkers
communicate fact-checking content to original posters?; and (P3)
how can we automatically generate fact-checking responses when
given content of original tweets?
To tackle the first problem (P1), we may use already available
datasets [15, 52, 54]. However, the dataset in [15] contains rela-
tively small number of original tweets (∼5,000) and many FC-tweets
(∼170K). Since FC-tweet generation process depends on contents of
original tweets, it may reduce diversity of generated responses. The
dataset in [54] is large but fully anonymized, and the dataset in [52]
does not contain original tweets. Therefore, we collected our own
dataset consisting of 64,110 original tweets and 73,203 FC-tweets
(i.e., each original tweet receives 1.14 FC-tweet) by using Hoaxy
system [46] and FC-tweets in [52].
To understand how fact-checkers convey credible information
to original posters and other users in online discussions (P2), we
conducted data-driven analysis of FC-tweets and found that fact-
checkers tend to refute misinformation and employ more imper-
sonal pronouns. Their FC-tweets were generally more formal and
did not contain much swear words and Internet slangs. These ana-
lytical results are important since we can reduce the likelihood to
generate racist tweets [14], hate speeches [7] and trolls [4].
To address the third problem (P3), we propose a deep learn-
ing framework to automatically generate fact-checking responses
for fact-checkers. In particular, we build the framework based on
Seq2Seq [49] with attention mechanisms [28].
Our contributions are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a novel
application of text generation for supporting fact-checkers and
increasing their engagement in fact-checking activities.
• We conduct a data-driven analysis of linguistic dimensions,
lexical usage and semantic frames of fact-checking tweets.
• We propose and build a deep learning framework to generate
responses with fact-checking intention. Experimental results
show that our models outperformed competing baselines quan-
titatively and qualitatively.
• We release our collected dataset and source code in public to
stimulate further research in fake news intervention3.
2We use the term “fact-checking tweets (FC-tweets)”, “fact-checking responses”, and
“fact-checking replies” interchangeably.
3https://github.com/nguyenvo09/LearningFromFactCheckers
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briefly cover related works about (1) misinfor-
mation and fact-checking, and (2) applications of text generation.
2.1 Misinformation and Fact-checking
Fake news is recently emerging as major threats of credibility of
information in cyberspace. Since human-based fact-checking sites
could not fact-check every falsified news, many automated fact-
checking systems were developed to detect fake news in its early
stage by using different feature sets [10, 15, 40, 54, 59], knowledge
graph [47] and crowd signals [16, 17, 34], and using deep learning
models [30, 39, 57]. In addition, other researchers studied how to
fact-check political statements [56], mutated claims fromWikipedia
[50] and answers in Q&A sites [32].
Other researchers studied intention of spreading fake news (e.g.
misleading readers, inciting clicks for revenue and manipulating
public opinions) and different types of misinformation (e.g. hoaxies,
clickbait, satire and disinformation) [42, 53]. Linguistic patterns of
political fact-checking webpages and fake news articles [13, 42]
were also analyzed. Since our work utilizes FC-tweets, analyzing
users’ replies [9, 15, 40, 54] are closely related to ours. However, the
prior works had limited attention on analyzing how fact-checkers
convey fact-checked content to original posters in public discourse.
Additionally, researchers investigated topical interests and tem-
poral behavior of fact-checkers [52], relationship between fact-
checkers and original posters [11], how fake news disseminated
when fact-checked evidences appeared [9], and whether users were
aware of fact-checked information when it was available [15]. Our
work is different from these prior works since we focus on lin-
guistic dimensions of FC-tweets, and propose and build a response
generation framework to support fact-checkers.
2.2 Applications of Text Generation
Text generation has been used for language modeling [33], ques-
tion and answering [12], machine translation [1, 28, 49], dialogue
generation [43–45, 51, 55], and so on. Recently, it is employed to
build chat bots for patients under depression4, customer assistants
in commercial sites, teen chat bots [14], and supporting tools for
teachers [3]. Text generation has been also used to detect fake re-
view [58], clickbait headlines [48], and fake news [41]. Our study
is the first work that generates responses based on FC-tweets as
a supporting tool for fact-checkers. Our work is closely related
with dialog generation in which there are three main technical
directions: (1) deterministic models [43, 45, 51, 55], (2) Variational
Auto-Encoders (VAEs) [44], and (3) Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs) [25]. Although recently VAEs and GANs showed
promising results, deterministic models are still dominant in litera-
ture since they are easier to train than VAEs and GANs, and achieve
competitive results [22]. Thus, we propose a response generation
framework based on Seq2Seq and attention mechanism [28].
3 DATASET
In this section, we describe our data collection and preprocessing
process. We utilized the dataset in [52] and the Hoaxy system [46]
4https://read.bi/2QZ0ZPn
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to collect FC-tweets, which contained fact-checking URLs from two
popular fact-checking sites: snopes.com, and politifact.com. Totally,
we collected 247,436 distinct fact-checking tweets posted between
May 16, 2016 and May 26, 2018.
Similar to [11, 52], we removed non-English FC-tweets, and FC-
tweets containing fact-checking URLs linked to non-article pages
such as the main page and about page of a fact-checking site. Then,
among the remaining fact-checking pages, if its corresponding
original tweet was deleted or was not accessible via Twitter APIs
because of suspension of an original poster, we further filtered out
the fact-checking tweet. As a result, 190,158 FC-tweets and 164,477
distinct original tweets were remained.
To further ensure that each of the remaining FC-tweets reflected
fact-checking intention and make a high quality dataset, we only
kept a fact-checking tweet whose fact-checking article was rated
as true or false. Our manual verification of 100 random samples
confirmed that fact-checking tweets citing fact-checking articles
with true or false label contained clearer fact-checking intention
than fact-checking tweets with other labels such as half true or
mixture. In other words, FC-tweets associated with mixed labels
were discarded. After the pre-processing steps, our final dataset
consisted of 73,203 FC-tweets and 64,110 original tweets posted by
41,732 distinct fact-checkers, and 44,411 distinct original posters,
respectively. We use this dataset in the following sections.
4 LINGUISTIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
FACT-CHECKING TWEETS
Since our goal is to automatically generate responses with fact-
checking intention, it is necessary to analyze what kind of linguistic
characteristics FC-tweets have, and verify whether FC-tweets in
our dataset have the fact-checking intention.
To highlight linguistic characteristics of FC-tweets, we compare
FC-tweets with Normal Replies, which are direct responses to the
same 64,110 original tweets without including fact-checking URLs,
and Random Replies, which do not share any common original
tweets with FC-tweets. Initially, we collected 262,148 English Nor-
mal Replies and 97M English Random Replies posted in the same
period of the FC-tweets. Then, we sampled 73,203 Normal Replies
and 73,203 Random Replies from the initial collection to balance the
data with our FC-tweets. All of the FC-tweets, Normal Replies and
Random Replies were firstly preprocessed by replacing URLs with
url and mentions with @user, and by removing special characters.
They were tokenized by the NLTK tokenizer. Then, we answer the
following research questions. Note that we sampled 73,203 Ran-
dom Replies and 73,203 Normal Replies four times more, and our
analysis was consistent with the following results.
Q1: What are underlying themes in FC-tweets?
To answer this question, we applied the standard LDA algorithm
to each of the three types of replies, so we built three independent
LDAmodels. Table 1 shows 5 topics extracted from each of the three
LDA topic models with associated keywords. Firstly, FC-tweets ex-
hibit clear fact-checking intention with keywords such as debunked,
snopes, read, stop, check, and lie. Secondly, keywords of Normal
Replies show awareness of misinformation. However, fact-checking
intention is not clear compared with FC-tweets. The keywords of
Random Replies are commonly used in daily conversations. Based
Table 1: 5 LDA topics and associated keywords of FC-tweets,
Normal Replies and Random Replies.
Types Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Topic 5
FC-tweets
read fake facts false true
stop news check snopes know
try that’s debunked lie story
Normal
Replies
one u fake president like
liar like news trump really
know f*** trump get stop
Random
Replies
love good like like thank
u thanks one would oh
know yes people right im
on the analysis, we conclude that the main themes of FC-tweets
are about fact-checking information in the original tweets.
Q2:What are the psycholinguistic characteristics of FC-tweets?
We employed LIWC 2015 [37], a standard approach for mapping
text to 73 psychologically-meaningful categories, for understanding
psychological characteristics of FC-tweets. Given each of FC-tweets,
we counted how many words of the FC-tweet belonged to each
LIWC category. Then, we computed a normalized score for the
category by diving the count by the number of words in the FC-
tweet. Finally, we report the average scores µ and variances σ 2 for
each LIWC category based on |FC-tweets|. The same process was
applied to Normal Replies and Random Replies. We examined all
LIWC categories and report only the most significant results.
(A) FC-tweets have thehighest usage of impersonal pronouns
and the least utilization of personal pronouns. In Figure 2(a),
we can see that FC-tweets exhibit the highest usage of impersonal
pronouns (e.g. it, this, that) (µ = 0.071,σ 2 = 0.01) in comparison
with Normal Replies (µ = 0.049,σ 2 = 0.009) and Random Replies
(µ = 0.054,σ 2 = 0.005). This observation is statistically significant
in Mann Whitney one sided U-test (p < 0.001). Examples of FC-
tweets containing impersonal pronouns (called iprons in LIWC)
are (i) @user This has been debunked repeatedly - url please stop
spreading the lie, thanks!, and (ii) @user it is a wonderful quote but
Lewis never said it : url and url.
Differently, Normal Replies show the highest mean score in 2nd
person pronouns (named you category) (µ = 0.071,σ 2 = 0.007,p <
0.001) in comparison to FC-tweets (µ = 0.037) and Random Replies
(µ = 0.047). Note that you in this context may refer to the original
posters. In 1st person pronouns (named I category), Random Replies
have highest score because they contain daily personal conversa-
tions between online users. Finally, FC-tweets have the smallest
usage ofwe (µ = 0.003,σ 2 = 0.000) and they (µ = 0.004,σ 2 = 0.000)
among three groups of replies (p < 0.001).
(B) FC-tweets have a tendency to refute content of original
tweets. Figure 2(b) shows the mean scores of adj, negate, differ
and certain categories. Specifically, FC-tweets exhibit the highest
mean score in adjectives category (µ = 0.080,σ 2 = 0.024,p < 0.001)
in comparison to Normal Replies (µ = 0.052,σ 2 = 0.008) and
Random Replies (µ = 0.056,σ 2 = 0.015). Prevalent adjectives in
FC-tweets are fake, wrong, dump, false, and untrue. FC-tweets also
tend to refute information of original tweets. Their mean score in
negate category is 0.054, which is about two times higher than the
mean score of Normal Replies (p < 0.001). FC-tweets have also
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Figure 2: LIWC category scores of FC-tweets, Normal Replies and Random Replies. In the figure, we follow LIWC category
abbreviations as labels [37]. For example, ipron and adjmean impersonal pronouns and adjectives, respectively.
the highest usage of words in differ category (e.g. actually, but,
except) among the three groups (p < 0.001). In certain category (e.g.
never, ever, nothing, always), FC-tweets’ mean score (µ = 0.036)
also doubles the average score of Normal Replies significantly (p <
0.001). Examples of FC-tweets are: (i)@userwrong.never happened.
url, (ii) @user except he didn’t. that tweet has been proven fake: url,
and (iii) @user I sure hope you’re joking. url.
(C) FC-tweets are usually more formal and have low usage
of swear words. In Figure 2(c), FC-tweets have lower mean score
in informal category (µ = 0.034,σ 2 = 0.010) than Normal Replies
(µ = 0.038,p < 0.001) and Random Replies (µ = 0.066). FC-tweets
also use the least swear words (µ = 0.013,σ 2 = 0.005,p < 0.005)
among the three groups. In terms of netspeak category (i.e. Internet
slangs), FC-tweets (µ ≈ 0.011) generally have smaller average score
than Random Replies (µ = 0.035). Furthermore, FC-tweets do not
contain much words in assent category (e.g. OK, yup, okey) (µ =
0.006,σ 2 = 0.002) compared with Random Replies (µ = 0.013,σ 2 =
0.005,p < 0.001). Regarding formality of FC-tweets, we conjecture
that fact-checkers try to persuade original posters to stop spreading
fake news, leading to more formal language, less usage of swear
words. An example of FC-tweets is@user url I’m sure you’ll still say
it’s true- but it simply isn’t. Google for facts and debunks please.
(D) FC-tweets emphasize onwhat happened in the pastwhereas
Normal Replies and Random Replies focus on present and
future. In Figure 2(d), FC-tweets usually employ verbs in past tense
to mention past stories to support their factual corrections. Thus,
the average score of focuspast category of FC-tweets is the high-
est (µ = 0.036,σ 2 = 0.005,p < 0.001) among the three groups of
replies, whereas Normal Replies and Random Replies emphasize
on present and future. Particularly, FC-tweets have the least score
in focuspresent (µ = 0.117,σ 2 = 0.015,p < 0.001) and focusfu-
ture (µ = 0.006,σ 2 = 0.000,p < 0.001) categories. An example of
FC-tweets is @user yeah, she merely said something that was only
slightly less absurd. url.
Q3: How are semantic frames represented in FC-tweets?
So far, we examined every word independently without consid-
ering its dependencies with other words (e.g. surrounding words),
which is helpful in understanding its meaning. Thus, we now em-
ploy SEMAFOR model [6], trained on FrameNet data5, to extract
rich structures called semantic frames based on syntactic trees of
5https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/frameIndex
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Figure 3: Distribution of semantic frame types in FC-tweets.
sentences. For example, a frame Statement consists of a noun and a
verb where the noun indicates a speaker and the verb implies the act
of conveying a message. We measured the distribution of semantic
frames of FC-tweets by firstly counting the number of occurrences
of every frame type across all FC-tweets, and normalized it by the
total number of detected frames in all FC-tweets. The same process
was applied to Normal Replies and Random Replies. Figure 3 shows
the percentage of different types of frames detected by SEMAFOR.
We have the following observations:
(A) FC-tweets display high usage of Artificiality, Statement
and Existence. In Figure 3, FC-tweets have the highest utilization
of Artificiality (e.g. wrong, lie, fake, false, genuine, phoney) among
three groups of replies (p < 0.001 according to one-sided z-test).
This frame accounts for 5.71% detected frames in FC-tweets com-
pared with Normal Replies (0.90%) and Random Replies (0.11%).
FC-tweets also have the highest proportion of the frame Statement
(3.96%,p < 0.001) among three groups of replies. Words that evoke
frame Statement in FC-tweets are said, says, claims, report, told,
talk, and mention. Examples of FC-tweets are (i) @user You’re the
one who has no clue. She never said this: url, and (ii) @user Snopes
reports this rumor as false. url. To refer to verified information,
FC-tweets employed frame Existence (1.38%, p < 0.001) compared
with Normal Replies (0.71%) and Random Replies (0.70%). The most
popular phrases evoking frame Existence were real, there is, there
are, exist, there were, and there have been. Examples of FC-tweets
are: (i) @user There is no trucker strike in Puerto Rico url, (ii) @user
That town doesnt exist url.
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Figure 4: (a) Similarity between FC-tweets and fact-checking
articles, (b) |Shares| vs. |Tokens| of FC-tweets and (c) Distri-
bution of irretrievable original tweets.
(B) FC-tweets exhibit the highest Morality_evaluation and
have less usage of Desirability. As shown in Figure 3, FC-tweets
contain the highest proportion of frameMorality_evaluation (1.06%,
p < 0.001) among three groups. The most popular words in frame
Morality_evaluation are wrong, evil, dishonest, despicable, unethi-
cal, and immoral. Another supporting evidence of this observation
is the lower usage of frame Desirability (e.g. good, better, bad, great,
okay, cool) in FC-tweets (1.19%, p < 0.001) than Normal Replies
(1.89%) and Random Replies (2.5%). An example of FC-tweets is:
@user you’re such an evil, despicable creature. url
(C) FC-tweets donot usemuchTemporal_collocation. FC-tweets
show lower usage of Temporal_collocation (1.08%, p < 0.001) than
Normal Replies (1.74%) and Random Replies (2.00%). The most com-
mon words that evoke this frame in FC-tweets are when, now, then,
today, current, recently, future. It seems these words are mainly
about the present and the future. This result supports the same
observation that FC-tweets tend to focus on the past.
Q4: Do fact-checkers include details of fact-checking arti-
cles? We firstly derived latent representations of FC-tweets and
articles by training two Doc2Vec models [23] - one for FC-tweets
and the other one for fact-checking articles. The embedding size is
50. Then, we measured cosine similarity between a FC-tweet and
the fact-checking article embedded in the FC-tweet as shown in
Figure 4(a). Interestingly, most FC-tweets do not have high similar-
ity with FC-articles, suggesting that fact-checkers rarely include
details from fact-checking articles in FC-tweets. However, there
were several enthusiastic fact-checkers who extracted information
from fact-checking articles to make FC-tweets more persuasive, as
shown in two tails of the curve in Figure 4(a).
Q5: Is there any connection between |tokens| of FC-tweets
and |shares|? Since sharing FC-tweets by retweets and quotes is
important for increasing the visibility of credible information on
online social networks, we examined correlation between |tokens|
of FC-tweets and their |shares|. We only focus on |tokens| because
it could help us to decide length of a generated response. Figure
4(b) shows a scatter plot of FC-tweets’ |tokens| and |shares| (i.e.,
quotes and retweets). Generally, most FC-tweets had |shares|=0.
However, FC-tweets with |tokens| ∈ [10; 20] usually received more
attention. To verify this, we created two lists – one containing
|shares| of FC-tweets with |tokens| ∈ [0; 9] and another one for
|shares| of FC-tweets with |tokens| ∈ [10; 20] –, and then conducted
Mann Whitney one-sided U-test. We found that the latter one had
significantly larger numbers than the former one (p = 2.91×10−11).
We conclude that very short FC-tweets may be not informative
enough to draw readers’ attention, and lengthy FC-tweets may be
too time-consuming to read, leading to small number of shares.
Therefore, a reasonable length of FC-tweets is more preferable
when we generate a response.
Q6: Is there any signal suggesting positive effect of FC-tweets?
We examined what happened to original tweets after receiving fact-
checking tweets. In Oct 2018 (i.e., five months after collecting our
dataset), we re-collected original tweets via Twitter APIs to see if
all of the original tweets were retrievable. Interestingly, 4,516 (7%)
original tweets were not retrievable. There are three reasons: (i)
User Suspension, (ii) Not Found Status (i.e. deleted status), and (iii)
Not Authorized (i.e. original tweets are in the private mode).
In Figure 4(c), User Suspension accounted for 58.30% of the irre-
trievable original tweets. Although there may be many factors that
potentially explain suspension (e.g. original posters may have other
abusing behaviors that triggered Twitter security system), one ob-
vious observation is that fact-checkers tended to target bad users
(e.g. content polluters [24]), who usually have abusing behavior on
social platform. It means that fact-checkers are enthusiastic about
checking credibility of information on social networks. Regarding
two reasons Not Authorized and Not Found Status, perhaps original
posters were either aware of the wrong information they posted
or were under pressure due to criticisms they received from other
users, leading to deletion or hiding their original tweets.
In summary, our analysis reveals fact-checkers refuted content of
original tweets, and their FC-tweets were more formal than Normal
Replies and Random Replies. To provide supporting evidences, FC-
tweets utilized semantic frames Existence and Statement. These
results confirm that FC-tweets exhibit clear fact-checking intention.
5 RESPONSE GENERATION FRAMEWORK
In the previous section, we analyzed common topics, lexical us-
ages, and distinguishing linguistic dimensions of FC-tweets com-
pared with Normal Replies and Random Replies. Our analysis re-
vealed that FC-tweets indeed exhibited clear fact-checking inten-
tion, which is the property that we desired. Now, we turn our
attention to proposing and building our framework, named Fact-
checking Response Generator (FCRG), in order to generate responses
with fact-checking intention. The generated responses are used to
support fact-checkers and increase their engagement.
Formally, given a pair of an original tweet and a FC-tweet, the
original tweet x is a sequence of words x = {xi |i ∈ [1;N ]} and
the FC-tweet is another sequence of words y = {yj |j ∈ [1;M]},
where N andM are the length of the original tweet and the length
of FC-tweet, respectively. We inserted a special token <s> as a
starting token into every FC-tweet. Drawing inspiration from [28],
we propose and build a framework as shown in Figure 5 that consists
of three main components: (i) the shared word embedding layer, (ii)
the encoder to capture representation of the original tweet and (iii)
the decoder to generate a FC-tweet. Their details are as follows:
5.1 Shared Word Embedding Layer
For every word xi in the original tweet x , we represent it as a one-
hot encoding vector xi ∈ RV and embed it into a D-dimensional
vector xi ∈ RD as follows: xi = Wexi , where We ∈ RD×V is
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Figure 5: Our proposed framework to generate responses
with fact-checking intention.
an embedding matrix and V is the vocabulary size. We use the
same word embedding matrixWe for the FC-tweet. In particular,
for every word yi (represented as one-hot vector yi ∈ RV ) in the
FC-tweet y, we embed it into a vector yi = Weyi . The embedding
matrixWe is a learned parameter and could be initialized by either
pre-trained word vectors (e.g. Glove vectors) or random initial-
ization. Since our model is designed specifically for fact-checking
domain, we initializedWe with Normal Distribution N(0, 1) and
trained it from scratch. By using a sharedWe , we could reduce the
number of learned parameters significantly compared with [28].
This is helpful in reducing overfitting.
5.2 Encoder
The encoder is used to learn latent representation of the original
tweet x . We adopt a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to represent
the encoder due to its large capacity to condition each word xi
on all previous words x<i in the original tweet x . To overcome
the vanishing or exploding gradient problem of RNN, we choose
Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [5]. Formally, we compute hidden state
hi ∈ RH at time-step ith in the encoder as follows:
hi = GRU (xi ,hi−1) (1)
where the GRU is defined by the following equations:
zi = σ (xiWz + hi−1Uz )
ri = σ (xiWr + hi−1Ur
)
h˜i = tanh
(
xiWo + (ri ⊙ hi−1)Uo )
hi = (1 − zi ) ⊙ h˜i + zi ⊙ hi−1
(2)
whereW[z,r,o],U[z,r,o] are learned parameters. h˜i is the new up-
dated hidden state, zi is the update gate, ri is the reset gate, σ (.) is
the sigmoid function, ⊙ is element wise product, and h0 = 0. After
going through every word of the original tweet x , we have hidden
states for every time-stepX = [h1 ⊕h2 ⊕ ...⊕hN ] ∈ RH×N , where
⊕ denotes concatenation of hidden states. We use the last hidden
state hN as features of the original tweet x = hN .
5.3 Decoder
The decoder takes x as the input to start the generation of a FC-
tweet. We use another GRU to represent the decoder to generate a
sequence of tokens y = {y1,y2, ..,yM }. At each time-step jth , the
hidden state hj is computed by another GRU: hj = GRU (yj ,hj−1)
where initial hidden states are h0 = x. To provide additional con-
text information when generating word yj , we apply an attention
mechanism to learn a weighted interpolation context vector cj
dependent on all of the hidden states output from all time-steps
of the encoder. We compute cj = Xaj where each component aji
of aj ∈ RN is the alignment score between the jth word in the
FC-tweet and the ith output from the encoder. In this study, aj is
computed by one of the following ways:
aj =
{
so f tmax(XT hj ) Dot Attention
so f tmax(XTWahj ) Bilinear Attention
(3)
where softmax(.) is a softmax activation function andWa ∈ RH×H
is a learned weight matrix. Note that we tried to employ other
attention mechanisms including additive attention [1] and con-
cat attention [28] but the above attention mechanisms in Eq. 3
produced better results. After computing the context vector cj , we
concatenate hTj with cTj to obtain a richer representation. The word
at jth time-step is predicted by a softmax classifier:
yˆj = so f tmax
(
Ws tanh
(
Wc [cTj ⊕ hTj ]T
) )
(4)
where Wc ∈ RO×2H , and Ws ∈ RV×O are weight matrices of a
two-layer feedforward neural network and O is the output size.
yˆj ∈ RV is a probability distribution over the vocabulary. The
probability of choosing word vk in the vocabulary as output is:
p(yj = vk |yj−1,yj−2, ...,y1,x) = yˆjk (5)
Therefore, the overall probability of generating the FC-tweet y
given the original tweet x is computed as follows:
p(y |x) =
M∏
j=1
p(yj |yj−1,yj−2, ...,y1,x) (6)
Since the entire architecture is differentiable, we jointly train the
whole network with Teacher Forcing via Adam optimizer [19] by
minimizing the negative conditional log-likelihood form pairs of
the original tweet x (i) and the FC-tweet y(i) as follows:
min
θe ,θd
L = −
m∑
i=1
logp(y(i) |x (i);θe ,θd ) (7)
where θe and θd are the parameters of the encoder and the decoder,
respectively. At test time, we used beam search to select top K
generated responses. The generation process of a FC-tweet is ended
when an end-of-sentence token (e.g. </s>) is emitted.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we thoroughly evaluate our models namely FCRG-
DT (based on dot attention in Eq. 3) and FCRG-BL (based on
bilinear attention in Eq. 3) quantitatively and qualitatively. We seek
to answer the following questions:
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Table 2: Performance of our models and baselines.
Constraints Model BLEU-2 BLEU-3 BLEU-4 ROUGE-L METEOR Greedy Mat. Vector Ext. Avg. Rank
Without
Constraints
SeqAttB 7.148 (4) 4.050 (4) 3.261 (3) 26.474 (3) 17.659 (3) 43.566 (3) 15.837 (4) 3.43
HRED 7.301 (3) 4.073 (3) 3.248 (4) 26.222 (4) 17.545 (4) 42.734 (4) 18.929 (3) 3.57
our FCRG-BL 7.678 (1) 4.270 (2) 3.406 (2) 27.142 (2) 17.871 (1) 43.714 (2) 20.244 (1) 1.57
our FCRG-DT 7.641 (2) 4.303 (1) 3.500 (1) 27.352 (1) 17.750 (2) 45.302 (1) 19.993 (2) 1.43
At least
5 tokens
SeqAttB 7.470 (4) 4.085 (4) 3.175 (4) 26.169 (4) 17.719 (3) 41.038 (4) 14.686 (4) 3.86
HRED 7.631 (3) 4.155 (3) 3.227 (3) 26.241 (3) 17.617 (4) 41.930 (3) 18.850 (3) 3.14
our FCRG-BL 7.925 (2) 4.285 (2) 3.295 (2) 26.953 (2) 17.885 (1) 42.899 (2) 20.052 (1) 1.71
our FCRG-DT 8.043 (1) 4.373 (1) 3.409 (1) 27.020 (1) 17.770 (2) 44.379 (1) 19.441 (2) 1.29
At least
10 tokens
SeqAttB 6.398 (4) 3.319 (4) 2.434 (4) 22.250 (4) 16.568 (4) 36.298 (4) 10.198 (4) 4.00
HRED 6.540 (3) 3.373 (3) 2.462 (3) 22.980 (3) 17.106 (3) 37.513 (3) 15.537 (3) 3.00
our FCRG-BL 7.576 (2) 3.780 (2) 2.660 (2) 25.086 (1) 17.832 (1) 39.809 (1) 17.605 (1) 1.43
our FCRG-DT 7.955 (1) 3.914 (1) 2.751 (1) 24.635 (2) 17.662 (2) 39.374 (2) 16.081 (2) 1.57
• RQ1:What are the performance of our models and baselines in
word overlap-based metrics (i.e., measuring syntactic similarity
between a ground-truth FC-tweet and a generated one)?
• RQ2: How do our models perform compared with baselines in
embedding metrics (i.e., measuring semantic similarity between
a ground-truth FC-tweet and a generated one)?
• RQ3: How does the number of generated tokens of responses
affect performance of our models?
• RQ4: Is our generated responses better than ones generated
from baselines in a qualitative evaluation?
• RQ5:What word embedding representatives in our model are
close to each other in the semantic space?
6.1 Baselines and Our Models
Since our methods are deterministic models, we compare themwith
state-of-the-art baselines in this direction.
• SeqAttB: Shang et al. [45] proposed a hybrid model that com-
bines global scheme and local scheme [1] to generate responses
for original tweets on Sina Weibo. This model is one of the first
work that generate responses for short text conversations.
• HRED: It [43] employs hierarchical RNNs for capturing infor-
mation in a long context. HRED is a competitive method and a
commonly used baseline for dialog generation systems.
• our FCRG-BL: This model uses the bilinear attention.
• our FCRG-DT: This model uses the dot attention.
6.2 Experimental Settings
Data Processing. Similar to [43] in terms of text generation, we re-
placed numbers with <number> and personal names with <person>.
Words that appeared less than three times were replaced by <unk>
token to further mitigate the sparsity issue. Our vocabulary size
was 15,321. The min, max and mean |tokens| of the original tweets
were 1, 89 and 19.1, respectively. The min, max and mean |tokens| of
FC-tweets were 3, 64 and 12.3, respectively. Only 791 (1.2%) original
tweets contained 1 token which is mostly a URL.
Experimental Design.We randomly divided 73,203 pairs of the
original tweets and FC-tweets into training/validation/test sets
with a ratio of 80%/10%/10%, respectively. The validation set was
used to tune hyperparameters and for early stopping. At test time,
we used the beam search to generate 15 responses per original
tweet (beam size=15), and report the average results. To select the
best hyperparameters, we conducted the standard grid search to
choose the best value of a hidden size H ∈ {200, 300, 400}, and an
output size O ∈ {256, 512}. We set word embedding size D to 300
by default unless explicitly stated. The length of the original tweets
and FC-tweets were set to the maximum value N = 89 andM = 64,
respectively. The dropout rate was 0.2. We used Adam optimizer
with fixed learning rate λ = 0.001, batch size b = 32, and gradient
clipping was 0.25 to avoid exploded gradient. The same settings are
applied to all models for the fair comparison.
A well known problem of the RNN-based decoder is that it tends
to generate short responses. In our domain, examples of commonly
generated responses were fake news url., you lie url., and wrong url.
Because a very short response may be less interesting and has less
power to be shared (as we learned in Section 4), we forced the beam
search to generate responses with at least τ tokens. Since 92.4% of
FC-tweets had |tokens| ≥ 5, and 60% FC-tweets had |tokens| ≥ 10,
we chose τ ∈ {0, 5, 10}. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4(b), FC-
tweets with |tokens| ∈ [10; 20] usually had more shares than FC-
tweets with |tokens| < 10. In practice, fact-checkers can choose
their preferred |tokens| of generated responses by varying τ .
Evaluation Metrics. To measure performance of our models and
baselines, we adopted several syntactic and semantic evaluation
metrics used in the prior works. In particular, we used word overlap-
based metrics such as BLEU scores [36], ROUGE-L [26], and ME-
TEOR [2]. These metrics evaluate the amount of overlapping words
between a generated response and a ground-truth FC-tweet. The
higher score indicates that the generated response are close/similar
to the ground-truth FC-tweet syntactically. In other words, the
generated response and the FC-tweet have a large number of over-
lapping words. Additionally, we also used embedding metrics (i.e.
Greedy Matching and Vector Extrema) [27]. These metrics usually
estimate sentence-level vectors by using some heuristic to combine
the individual word vectors in the sentence. The sentence-level
vectors between a generated response and the ground-truth FC-
tweet are compared by a measure such as cosine similarity. The
higher value means the response and the FC-tweet are semantically
similar.
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Table 3: The results of human evaluation.
Opponent Win Loss Tie Fleiss Kappa
our FCRG-DT vs. SeqAttB 40% 28% 32% 0.725
our FCRG-DT vs. HRED 40% 36% 24% 0.592
6.3 RQ1 & RQ3: Quantitative Results based on
Word Overlap-based Metrics
In this experiment, we quantitatively measure performances of all
models by using BLEU, ROUGE-L, and METEOR. Table 2 shows re-
sults in the test set. Firstly, our FCRG-DT and FCRG-BL performed
equally well, and outperformed the baselines – SeqAttB and HRED.
In practice, FCRG-DT model is more preferable due to fewer param-
eters compared with FCRG-BL. Overall, our models outperformed
SeqAttB perhaps because fusing global scheme (i.e. the last hidden
state of the encoder) and output hidden state of every time-step
ith in the encoder may be less effective than using only the latter
one to compute context vector cj . HRED model utilized only global
context without using context vector cj in generating responses,
leading to suboptimal results compared with our models.
Under no constraints on |tokens| of generated responses, our
FCRG-DT achieved 6.24% (p < 0.001) improvement against SeqAttB
on BLEU-3 according to Wilcoxon one-sided test. In BLEU-4, FCRG-
DT improved SeqAttB by 7.32% and HRED by 7.76% (p < 0.001). In
ROUGE-L, FCRG-DT improved SeqAttB and HRED by 3.32% and
4.31% with p < 0.001, respectively. In METEOR, our FCRG-DT and
FCRG-BL achieved comparable performance with the baselines.
When |tokens| ≥ 5, we even achieve better results. The improve-
ments of FCRG-DT over SeqAttB were 7.05% BLEU-3, 7.37% BLEU-4
and 3.25% ROUGE-L (p < 0.001). In comparison with HRED, the
improvements of FCRG-DT were 5.25% BLEU-3, 5.64% BLEU-4, and
2.97% ROUGE-L (p < 0.001). Again, FCRG-DT are comparable with
SeqAttB and HRED in METEOR measurement.
When |tokens| ≥ 10, there was a decreasing trend across met-
rics as shown in Table 2. It makes sense because generating longer
response similar with a ground-truth FC-tweet is much harder
problem. Therefore, in reality, the Android messaging service rec-
ommends a very short reply (e.g., okay, yes, I am indeed) to reduce
inaccurate risk. Despite the decreasing trend, our FCRG-DT and
FCRG-BL improved the baselines by a larger margin. In particular,
in BLEU-3, FCRG-DT outperformed SeqAttB and HRED by 17.9%
and 16.0% (p < 0.001), respectively. For BLEU-4, the improvements
of FCRG-DT over SeqAttB and HRED were 13.02% and 11.74%
(p < 0.001), respectively. We observed consistent improvements
over the baselines in ROUGE-L and METEOR.
Overall, our models outperformed the baselines in terms of all
of the word overlap-based metrics.
6.4 RQ2 & RQ3: Quantitative Results based on
Embedding Metrics
We adopted two embedding metrics to measure semantic similarity
between generated responses and ground-truth FC-tweets [27].
Again, we tested all the models under three settings as shown in
Table 2. Our FCRG-DT performed best in all embedding metrics.
Specifically, FCRG-DT outperformed SeqAttB by 3.98% and HRED
by 6.00% improvements with p < 0.001 in Greedy Matching. FCRG-
DT’s improvements over SeqAttB and HREDwere 26.24% and 5.62%
(p < 0.001), respectively in Vector Extrema. When |tokens| ≥ 5, our
FCRG-DT also outperformed the baselines in both GreedyMatching
and Vector Extrema. In |tokens| ≥ 10, our models achieved better
performance than the baselines in all the embedding metrics. In
particular, FCRG-BL model performed best, and then FCRG-DT
model was the runner up. To sum up, FCRG-DT and FCRG-BL
outperformed the baselines in Embedding metrics.
6.5 RQ4: Qualitative Evaluation
Next, we conducted another experiment to compare our FCRG-DT
with baselines qualitatively. In the experiment, we chose FCRG-
DT instead of FCRG-BL since it does not require any additional
parameters and had comparable performance with FCRG-BL. We
also used τ = 10 to generate responses with at least 10 tokens
in all models since lengthy responses are more interesting and
informative despite a harder problem.
Human Evaluation. Similar to [45], we randomly selected 50 orig-
inal tweets from the test set. Given each of the original tweets, each
of FCRG-DT, SeqAttB and HRED generated 15 responses. Then, one
response with the highest probability per model was selected. We
chose a pairwise comparison instead of listwise comparison tomake
easy for human evaluators to decide which one is better. Therefore,
we created 100 triplets (original tweet, response1, response2) where
one response was generated from our FCRG-DT and the other one
was from a baseline. We employed three crowd-evaluators to eval-
uate each triplet where each response’s model name was hidden
to the evaluators. Given each triplet, the evaluators independently
chose one of the following options: (i) win (response1 is better), (ii)
loss (response2 is better), and (iii) tie (equally good or bad). Before
labeling, they were trained with a few examples to comprehend the
following criteria: (1) the response should fact-check information
in the original tweet, (2) it should be human-readable and be free
of any fluency or grammatical errors, (3) the response may depend
on a specific case or may be general but do not contradict the first
two criteria. The majority voting approach was employed to judge
which response is better. If annotators rated a triplet with three dif-
ferent answers, we viewed the triplet as a tie. Table 3 shows human
evaluation results. The Kappa values show moderate agreement
among the evaluators. We conclude that FCRG-DT outperforms
SeqAttB and HRED qualitatively.
Case Studies. Table 4 presents examples of original tweets, ground-
truth FC-tweets, and generated responses of the three models.
Our FCRG-DT generated more relevant responses with clear fact-
checking intention. For example, in the first example, FCRG-DT
captured the uranium in the original tweet and generated a relevant
response.We observed that SeqAttB usually generated non-relevant
content. Responses generated by FCRG-DT were more formal than
ones generated by the baselines.
6.6 RQ5: Similar Words in the Semantic Space
As our word embeddings were trained from scratch, we seek to in-
vestigate if our model can identify words semantically close/similar
to each other. This analysis will help us gain more insights about
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Table 4: Examples of original tweets, ground-truth FC tweets, generated responses of our FCRG-DT and two baselines.
Pairs of the original tweet (OT) and ground-truth FC-tweet Generated responses of our FCRG-DT and two baselines
OT:@user <person> sold <number> % of our uranium
to russia . that’s your candidate .
FC-tweet: except that she did not . url @user
SeqAttB: @user no , <person> did not start the birther movement . url
HRED: @user here you go , read the whole thing . url
FCRG-DT: @user allegations about hrc are false .
she did not have to give uranium to russia : url
OT:@user i just feel bad for poor franklin (?) , all alone on
his side of the table ...
FC-tweet:@user interesting . url
SeqAttB: @user there is no trucker strike in puerto rico url
HRED: @user this is a fake . sorry folks . url
FCRG-DT: @user snopes says this is not true . url url
OT:@user that is why i asked the question so i could have
an understanding
FC-tweet:@user do use a troll as your source of info url
SeqAttB:@user <person> kissed by former klan member : url
HRED: @user here you go , read the whole thing . url
FCRG-DT: @user this is a fake quote . sorry folks . url
OT: show me where <person> actually said that , other
than this photoshopped picture from the internet .
FC-tweet:@user fake quote . url
SeqAttB: @user no, <person> did not start the birther movement. url
HRED: @user yeah , no , they are not . url
FCRG-DT: @user this is a fake news site , right ? url
OT:@user also , you are giving me a different set of statistics
than the ones i asked for .
FC-tweet:@user here’s what he misquoted to start . url
SeqAttB: @user here you go , read the facts : url
HRED: @user here ya go : url read this . url
FCRG-DT: @user this is a fake quote from <person> . url
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Figure 6: 2-D visualization of word embeddings learned
from our FCRG-DT model.
our dataset. After training our FCRG-DT, we extracted the embed-
ding vectors from the shared embedding layer shown in Figure
5. We selected three keywords such as obamacare, politifact and
anti-trump. For each keyword, we found top 10 most similar words
based on cosine similarity between extracted embedding vectors
and used t-SNE to project these vectors into 2D space as shown
in Figure 6. Firstly, the keyword obamacare associated with health
care policies of the Obama administration in Figure 6(a) was similar
with elder, AMT (Alternative Minimum Tax), immunity and check-
ing. Next, politifact in Fig. 6(b) is close to debunks, there, anecdote,
DNC (Democratic National Committee) and answered. Finally, with
anti-trump in Fig. 6(c), our model identified obama-clinton, dictator,
clickbait, and inability. Based on this analysis, we conclude that
embedding vectors learned from our model can capture similar
words in the semantic space.
7 DISCUSSION
Although our proposed models successfully generated responses
with fact-checking intention, and performed better than the base-
lines, there are a few limitations in our work. Firstly, we assumed
fact-checkers are freely choose articles that they prefer, and then
insert corresponding fact-checking URLs into our generated re-
sponses. It means we achieved partial automation in a whole fact-
checking process. In our future work, we are interested in even
automating the process of selecting an fact-checking article based
on content of original tweets in order to fully support fact-checkers
and automate the whole process. Secondly, our framework is based
on word-based RNNs, leading to a common issue: rare words are
less likely to be generated. A feasible solution is using character-
level RNNs [18] so that we do not need to replace rare words with
<unk> token. In the future work, we will investigate if character-
based RNN models work well on our dataset. Thirdly, we only used
pairs of a original tweet and a FC-tweet without utilizing other
data sources such as previous messages in online dialogues. As
we showed in Figure 4(a), FC-tweets often did not contain content
of fact-checking articles, leading to difficulties in using this data
source. We tried to use the content of fact-checking articles, but
did not improve performance of our models. We plan to explore
other ways to utilize the data sources in the future. Finally, there
are many original tweets containing URLs pointing to fake news
sources (e.g. breitbart.com) but we did not consider them when
generating responses. We leave this for future exploration.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel application of text generation
in combating fake news. We found that there were distinguishing
linguistic features of FC-tweets compared with Normal and Ran-
dom Replies. Notably, fact-checkers tended to refute information
in original tweets and referred to evidences to support their factual
corrections. Their FC-tweets were usually more formal, and con-
tained less swear words and Internet slangs. These findings indicate
that fact-checkers sought to persuade original posters in order to
stop spreading fake news by using persuasive and formal language.
In addition, we observed that when FC-tweets were posted, 7%
original tweets were removed, deleted or hidden from the public.
After analyzing FC-tweets, we built a deep learning framework to
generate responses with fact-checking intention. Our model FCRG-
DT was able to generate responses with fact-checking intention
and outperformed the baselines quantitatively and qualitatively.
Our work has opened a new research direction to combat fake news
by supporting fact-checkers in online social systems.
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